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Abstract
This article outlines the case against NATO as having committed war crimes that the author
believes should have been tried before the ICTY. The author argues that by not subjecting countries
like the United States and other NATO members to international criminal trials and consequences,
it undermines international criminal law. The author concludes by discussing the ICC and the
United States qualified signing of, and suggested withdrawal from, the treaty and the ramifications
that it has for the legitimacy of international criminal law.
NATO'S BOMBING OF KOSOVO UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
OUR CASE AGAINST NATO AND THE
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM IT
Michael Mandel*
I got involved with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia' ("ICTY") in May 1999. That is when I
and a group of lawyers from North and South America filed a
war crimes complaint against sixty-eight individual leaders of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") at The Hague.
The leaders included all the prime ministers, presidents, foreign
and defense ministers of the NATO countries, and various offi-
cials of NATO itself, that is to say Clinton, Albright, Cohen, Blair,
Chrrtien etc., down through Javier Solana, Wesley Clark, andJa-
mie Shea. With a legal team from Canada, France, Great Brit-
ain, Greece, and Norway, we went to The Hague to make our
case to Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour (and then her replace-
ment Carla Del Ponte) and filed volumes of briefs and evidence.
Like literally thousands around the world, we demanded that Ar-
bour and Del Ponte enforce the law against NATO. In March
2000, it became clear to us what we and others had long sus-
pected, namely that the tribunal was a hoax, and we gave up on
it. In June, Del Ponte announced that she had determined that
NATO was not guilty of any crimes and that (rather illogically)
she was not opening an investigation into whether they had com-
mitted any.2 She released a report that was an amateur white-
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. The au-
thor wishes to thank Osgoode students Trung Nguyen and Melanie Banka for their
research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
2. Press Release, Prosecutor for International Tribunals Briefs Security Council
(June 2, 2000).
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wash. Fortunately Amnesty International issued its own very
careful and competent report at the same time 3 -in fact, Del
Ponte rushed to announce her results a week early to steal the
thunder from Amnesty. Amnesty concluded NATO was guilty of
war crimes.4
I defy anyone to read the two reports and not conclude that
the ICTY report is a fraud.
Reflection on this experience with international criminal
law has led me to the conclusion that the whole thing is in the
tradition of the Trojan horse, a gift of which we must beware
from the new Greeks of America who want to use it to hide their
aggressive and violent imperial politics.
Another way of putting this is that I think Slobodan
Milosevic had a very good point (English grammar apart) when
he told The Hague judges on his first appearance before them
that the Tribunal "is false tribunal, and indictments false indict-
ments."5 And when he said that the "trial's aim is to produce
false justification for the war crimes of NATO committed in Yu-
goslavia,"6 he was merely echoing the American State Depart-
ment official who wrote the Statute for Madeleine Albright in
the first place. Michael Scharf meant no criticism of the ICTY,
only the governments, when he wrote in October 1999 that:
[T] he tribunal was widely perceived within the government as
little more than a public relations device and as a potentially
useful policy tool .... Indictments also would serve to isolate
offending leaders diplomatically, strengthen the hand of
their domestic rivals and fortify the international political will
to employ economic sanctions or use force. 7
Treating the tribunal as one that perceived itself as merely a
propaganda arm of NATO, is the only way to make sense of its
violation of the most basic principles of judicial impartiality.
This is apparent above all in its failure to charge NATO leaders
3. AMNESTY INT'L, NATO/FEDEA.AL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: "COLLATERAL DAM-
AGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPER-
ATION ALLIED FORCE (June 7, 2000), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai/nsf/
index/EUR700182000.
4. Id.
5. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case no. IT-98-37, Transcript, at 2 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe37/010703A.htm.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Michael Scharf, Indicted for War Crimes, Then What?, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at
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for the crimes they committed in the bombing campaign, some-
thing it was legally required to do by its Statute, not to mention
morally required to do by the facts of the case. But it is also
unmistakable in the way it pursued the Serb authorities, clearly
far more concerned with legitimating NATO's war on Yugoslavia
than with doing justice. Following are some examples.
Racak, January 15, 1999: the event that the Americans used
as a cause of war. It is still not clear whether this was a genuine
massacre of forty-five defenseless Albanians by Serb soldiers or a
monstrous hoax perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army
("KLA"). But it did not matter to the Americans. Up until then,
the Security Council and independent observers judged the vio-
lence as provocation by KLA "terrorists" and retaliation by
Serbs.8 But the day this occurred, the head of the observer mis-
sion for the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE"), American State Department official, William Walker,
decided to hold a press conference calling it a "massacre" and a
"crime against humanity."9 This was clearly an American politi-
cal decision and not a moral one on Walker's part. Walker was
an old hand at massacres. He was named in the indictment in
the Iran-Contra affair and was a major player in other bloody,
illegal Latin American adventures of the Reagan-Bush period.
He was well known for turning the other way when U.S.-backed
paramilitaries killed priests in El Salvador in 1989. He must have
been well known to Louise Arbour. Yet, within one day and with
no further investigation, she was at the border of Kosovo with
television cameras declaring that she was "opening an investiga-
tion." Within four days, having consulted only with NATO offi-
cials, she declared it a war crime for which the perpetrators
would be punished. °
Remember that despite a year's worth of powerful and cor-
8. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160
(1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3939th mtg., S/RES/1199 (1998); Report of the Secre-
tary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), and 1203 (1998) of
the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1221 (1998); William E. Ratcliff,
"Madeleine's War" and the Costs of Intervention, 22 HARV. INT'L REv. 70, 71 (2001).
9. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: Kosovo AND BEYOND 60 (2000); Ambassador
William Walker, On the Record Briefing on the Kosovo Verification Mission (Jan. 8,
1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1999/990108walkerko-
sovo.html.
10. Press Release, Statement from the Prosecutor Regarding Kosovo Investigation
Uan. 20, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p379-e.htm.
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roborated evidence accumulated and submitted by thousands to
Arbour and Del Ponte on NATO crimes, they declared that they
were not even "opening an investigation." One day and one sus-
picious word was enough in Racak, when the Americans decided
to change policy and go to war with Yugoslavia. Racak was the
pretext for the war and the ICTY legitimated the pretext. Racak
led directly to Rambouillet. The failure of the Serbs to agree to
the United States' demands at Rambouillet was the justification
of the bombing.
Then, only days after the bombing had commenced, Arbour
announced an indictment of the noted Serb paramilitary leader
"Arkan" for alleged war crimes in Bosnia, an indictment that she
had kept secret since 1997.1 Why announce it then? She said it
was to warn everyone from associating with him in further crimes
in Kosovo.1 2 As if all the players did not know Arbour was after
Arkan. As if that could dissuade him from anything-evidently
he had other more serious things to worry about, since he would
be gunned down by assassins before the year was out. The only
thing the announcement could do, and therefore what it must
have been meant to do, was to demonize the Serbs and give
credibility to the United States' justification for the bombing.
In early May, Arbour made successive television appear-
ances with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and American
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Cook made a great show
of handing over war crimes dossiers that NATO had prepared
against Yugoslav authorities, and Albright swore undying alle-
giance to the ICTY and promised it more money. But by the
time Arbour was being all friendly on TV with them, whatJamie
Shea called "collateral damage"1 " (the death and maiming of ci-
vilian men, women, and children) was mounting, and well-
founded and documented war crimes complaints against Cook
and Albright had reached Arbour from thousands of citizens
around the world-read Amnesty's report that was later released
to see how well-founded they were. But did she care? She was
not even embarrassed by a helpful hyperlink to the NATO web-
site on the ICTY homepage throughout the "investigation" of
11. Press Release, Statement by the Prosecutor (March 31, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p391e.htm.
12. Id.
13. NATO Spokesperson Jamie Shea & Air Commodore David Wilby, Press Confer-
ence (Mar. 30, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/press/p990330a.htm.
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NATO.' 4
The most egregious example of the Tribunal's role as
NATO's propaganda arm occurred on May 22 when, midway
through the war (as civilian casualties of NATO's bombing were
sickening the world), Arbour announced the indictment of Yu-
goslav President Slokodan Milosevic for various crimes, includ-
ing murder. 5 Apart from Racak, all of the charges concerned
deaths that had occurred after the bombing had commenced. 6
In other words, this indictment, based on undisclosed evidence
supplied by NATO alone, came in the midst of a blistering
bombing attack, for events which had occurred in some cases
only six weeks earlier in the middle of the war zone. Though
NATO tried to claim the indictment "embarrassed" them,17 the
evidence all came from the Americans. Any impartial prosecu-
tor would have regarded this evidence as very suspicious, per-
haps the basis for an investigation once the bombing had
stopped, but for an indictment during a war? Of course, this has
to be compared with the inability of the Tribunal to even "open
an investigation" after one year of being provided with over-
whelming evidence in the public domain of NATO leaders'
crimes, which, on the most conservative estimates, resulted in
the deaths of far more civilians than those for which the Serb
leadership was indicted.'"
The purely propaganda nature of the Milosevic indictment
became even clearer when Del Ponte took over from Arbour and
said her first priority would be gathering evidence against him,19
in other words admitting that the indictment was preferred even
14. Do not bother trying to find it anymore. It was removed sometime after the
report was released and the presence of the link was ridiculed by at least one ICTY
critic. I have a printout of the page from April 22, 2000 for anyone interested in seeing
it.
15. Press Release, Prosecutor for International Tribunals Briefs Security Council,
supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. NoAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILITARY HUMANISM 98 (1999).
18. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (Feb. 2000);
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Economic Survey
(Nov. 10, 1999) ("[M]ore than 1800 [were] killed and 5,000 wounded some 2,000
wounded persons will remain disabled for life.").
19. Press Release, Statement by Carla Del Ponte Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Investigation and Prosecution of
Crimes Committed in Kosovo (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/p437-e.htm.
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with most of the evidence still missing. When Milosevic first ap-
peared in Court, Del Ponte added hundreds of victims to the
counts against him, but apparently disappointed by the num-
bers, she announced (once again, for effect, that is well in antici-
pation of the fact) that she would be bringing "genocide"
charges against him for his part in the Bosnian civil war.20 This
in turn was aided by the Trial Division's judgment in Krstic,21
that genocide could consist of the murder of seven or eight
thousand military-aged men (itself a very rough maximum esti-
mate by the court) from one village in the middle of a military
struggle over territory. A horrible crime, no doubt about it, but
would it not have been enough to call it murder? Not if you
wanted to Nazify the Serbs.
At the conclusion of the bombing, Arbour handed over the
investigation of war crimes in Kosovo to the NATO countries'
own police forces, notwithstanding their obvious motivation to
falsify the evidence. When people started to question the pau-
city of the victims, compared to NATO claims (mass graves either
did not exist or turned out to be individual graves), Carla Del
Ponte made a well-publicized and improvised visit to the Security
Council-I know it was improvised because she had to cancel a
long-scheduled meeting with me to attend-to reassure the
world that the victims could yet well amount to what NATO had,
at least in its more modest moments, alleged. We have heard
nothing from her since on this subject.22
So, whatever the guilt of the Serbs, the Tribunal acted more
like a NATO press office than a court; this may not cast doubt on
the guilt of the Serbs, but it certainly casts doubt on the legiti-
macy of the ICTY.
The real proof was in the failure to charge NATO, which is
where I came in.
According to reputable polls taken during the bombing,
20. Id.
21. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33,Judgement (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/krystic/TrialCI/judgement/index.htm.
22. After the arrest of Milosevic, Serb authorities announced they had found an-
other 800 Albanian bodies that had been buried in Serbia to cover up crimes in Kosovo
during the war. Without minimizing the terrible tragedy of each one of these deaths, it
has to be said that even adding these would bring the "genocide" up to about 3,000
victims.
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most of the world opposed this war.2' Though supporters had
some big names on their side such as Wiesel, Sontag, and
Rushdie, we opponents did too: Miko Theodorakis, Claude
Lantzmann-who called the war a "new Dreyfus Affair,"-Alex-
ander Solzhenytsin, Roy Medvedev, Harold Pinter, Noam Chom-
sky, and Ramsey Clark.
Above all, we opponents did not believe the NATO coun-
tries, and particularly the United States, when they said they
were acting out of necessity and for humanitarian reasons.
There were a number of reasons for this. In the first place, the
United States had never, in my experience, acted out of humani-
tarian motives in its military interventions before. It had a his-
tory of purely self-interested aggression in the world and zero
respect for the lives of civilians: from the atomic bombs on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, through the napalming of Vietnam and the
carpet-bombing of Cambodia, to the destruction of Iraq. This is
a country that for no legal or legitimate reason keeps up a lethal
sanctions regime, as well as a casual bombardment campaign
(including the use of anti-human cluster bombs), that is reputa-
bly said to have killed thousands of Iraqi children every month
for ten years.24 The hypocrisy of the justification is, once again,
almost beyond belief: "weapons of mass destruction" and the re-
23. An opinion poll taken in mid-April 1999 and published by The Economist
showed enormous opposition to the war both outside and inside the NATO countries.
The poll showed more than a third of the population opposed in my own country,
Canada, and in Finland, France, Germany, and Poland; almost an even split in Hun-
gary; an even split in Italy; and a majority opposed in the Czech Republic, Russia, and
Taiwan. Oh What a Lovely War!, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999. Historian Roy Medvedev
wrote during the war that Russians were 95% opposed. Roy Medvedev, La Rabbia Dei
Russi (The Anger of the Russians), LA REPUBBLICA, Apr. 20, 1999, at 1. Opposition in the
world's two most populous states, China and India, was official and assumed to be wide-
spread in the population. CHOMSKY, supra note 17, at 142; Press Release, U.N. Security
Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999), available at http://wwwO.un.org/
news/press/docs/1999/19990326.sc6659.html. A poll taken in Greece, a NATO coun-
try, between April 29 and May 5, 1999 showed 99.5% against the war with 85% believing
NATO's motives to be strategic and not humanitarian. Interestingly enough, 69% of
those polled were in favor of charging Bill Clinton with war crimes, 35.2% for charging
Tony Blair, and only 14% for charging Slobodan Milosevic, not far from the 13% in
favor of charging NATO General Wesley Clark and the 9.6% for charging NATO Secre-
tary General Javier Solana. Majority in Greece Wants Clinton Tied for War Crimes, IRISH
TIMES, May 27, 1999, at 13. In the United States itself, despite the relentless pro-bomb-
ing reporting of CNN, public opinion was evenly divided, and towards the end of the
campaign had fallen below 50%. IGNATIEFF, supra note 9, at 193.
24. See Tariq Ali, Our Herods, 5 NEW LEF-r REVIEW 5, 13 (2000).
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fusal to cooperate with international institutions. The first,
when the United States is the master of nuclear weaponry and is
the only country to have actually used it against humans, not to
mention an admitted chemical warfare "research" program that
caused it to refuse in 2001 to sign an international ban. The
second, when it is now widely accepted that the United States
used arms inspection for spying on Iraqi defenses, the way they
used the OSCE for bringing war to Yugoslavia.
This is the country that prevented the Security Council from
intervening in Rwanda because it was not prepared to help and
did not want to look bad.
This is a country that has underwritten repressive regimes
from Somoza, to Pinochet, to Suharto, to the Kuwaitis, and to
the Saudis. Within the heart of NATO, Turkey has carried out a
violent repression of the Kurds that has claimed 30,000 lives, not
2,000 like the one in Kosovo had before the intervention.21
Furthermore, the United States is a notorious violator of the
human rights of its own citizens: a country of racial segregation,
poverty amidst prodigious wealth, police brutality, bursting pris-
ons, and the death penalty. The United States has the biggest
prison population outside Russia;26 and, unlike Russia and Yugo-
slavia-which have banned the death penalty-during 1999, the
United States executed two of its own citizens by lethal injection
every week.27
Not only that, and this is extremely important, in the
Balkans itself, the United States, along with the rich countries of
Europe, made a crucial contribution to the disintegration and
descent into violence of the former Yugoslavia through aggres-
sive economic policies motivated by pure greed as well as a de-
sire to destroy Eastern European socialism.
The imposition of economic shock therapy on the Eastern
European economies immediately plunged them into a deep de-
pression. That is why they call it "shock" therapy. Yugoslavia lost
25. CHOMSKY, supra note 17, at chapt. II1.
26. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS fig. 6.1 (Ann L. Pastore & Kath-
leen Maguire eds., 2000), available at, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/
t6001.pdf.
27. Capital Punishment 1999, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice), Dec. 2000, at 12, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
cp99.pdf.
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two-thirds of its income in the early nineties. 2' The split-up of
the country was also a function of shock therapy: Yugoslavia
could not afford the transfer payments necessary to keep the
country together. But this was not the operation of immutable
economic laws. It was imposed by the rich countries through
their pseudo-independent financial institutions (the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank) so that they could
buy off East European productive resources at bargain basement
prices and subject their economies to Western dominance in a
"hub-and-spoke" arrangement that divided and conquered. The
European Union ("EU") then recognized the Balkan republics
on the basis of borders that were a recipe for civil war. What
followed was the Bosnian bloodbath, whose persistence was en-
sured by successive American administrations' relentless tor-
pedoing of peace plans with a real chance of success, including
the Lisbon plan of 1992 and the Vance-Owen plan of 1993. Re-
member that the "genocide" at Srebrenica did not happen until
1995.
The NATO countries did precious little to stop the fighting.
They cultivated the KLA, who were encouraged to engage in
deadly provocations with the Serbs, inviting retaliation precisely
to bring down NATO's bombs. NATO made noisy preparations
for war for a year prior to the attack of March 24, 1999. Then
there was the Racak affair (also a signal), and then the fake ne-
gotiations at Rambouillet. At Rambouillet, the NATO countries
said they had ten non-negotiable demands.29 None of them in-
28. Trends in Europe and North America, UN/ECE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK Jan. 17,
1999, available at http://www.unece.org/stats/trend/yug.htm; see also BoB ALLEN, WH4Y
Kosovo? THE ANATOMY OF A NEEDLESS WAR 12 (1999); PETER GOWAN, THE GLOBAL
GAMBLE: WASHINGTON'S FAUSTIAN BID FOR WORLD DOMINANCE 203-36 (1999).
29. The Rambouillet process is based upon a group of non-negotiable princi-
ples and on a detailed general agreement concerning the provisional status of
Kosovo for a three-year period. These principles call for an immediate end to
hostilities, broad autonomy for Kosovo, an executive legislative assembly
headed by a president, a Kosovar judicial system, a democratic system, elec-
tions under the auspices of the OSCE within nine months of the signing of the
agreement, respect of the rights of all persons and ethnic groups, and the
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with Kosovo remain-
ing within the country.
Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Sec. Policy, Dep't of Foreign
Affairs and Int'l Trade, Testimony Before the Standing Committee on National Defense
And Veterans Affairs of the Canadian House of Commons (Feb. 9, 1999); see also NATO
Spokesperson Jamie Shea, Morning Briefing (May 17, 1999), available at http://
www.nato.int/kosovo/press/b990517a.htn.
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cluded NATO presence or independence for Kosovo. The Serbs
accepted every one of the ten, but the Albanians balked. Then,
suddenly, the terms changed and the Serbs were presented with
new terms that were impossible to accept and were meant to be
so: a referendum on Kosovo's final status and total occupation
of Kosovo by NATO, with a free hand in Yugoslavia itself.
The Americans withdrew the OSCE observers and com-
menced a bombing campaign ostensibly to enforce Rambouillet
but really manifestly aimed at encouraging a refugee crisis which
did not exist before the bombing, but which was an entirely fore-
seeable result of it. (General Wesley Clark claimed only to be
surprised at the size of it). This was then used to justify an inten-
sification of the bombing, aimed mainly at breaking civilian mo-
rale, because NATO did not want to risk their soldiers' lives.
And they did not lose one. Now that is "impunity."
And who could look honestly at the results of this war,
unblinkered by the "official story" of the Western mass media,
and conclude that this was a "humanitarian intervention?" A
bombing campaign that, in dropping 25,000 bombs on Yugosla-
via, directly killed between 500 and 1,800 civilian men, women,
and children of all ethnicities and permanently injured as many
others;3 ° a bombing campaign that caused 60 to 100 billion U.S.
dollars worth of damage to an already impoverished country;3 a
bombing campaign that directly and indirectly caused one mil-
lion refugees to flee Kosovo in all directions;3 2 a bombing cam-
paign that indirectly caused the death of maybe thousands more
by provoking the violent retaliatory and defensive measures that
were entirely predictable when you massively bomb one people
on behalf of another and give a free hand to extremists on both
sides to vent their hatred. It was a bombing campaign that led to
the entirely predictable "ethnic cleansing" that has occurred in
Kosovo since the entry of the triumphant KLA, fully backed by
NATO's might, which has seen hundreds of thousands of Serbs
and Roma (and the few Jews remaining) driven out of Kosovo.
It left hundreds murdered, a murder rate about twice the Ameri-
30. Human Rights Watch, supra note 18.
31. James McLean, Yugoslavia "Will be the Poorest Man in Europe", EVENING STANDARD
(LONDON), Aug. 24, 1999, at 37.
32. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-KVM) Human Rights Division,
Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/doc-
uments/reports/hr/partl /chl 4.htm#1.
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can one, already one of the highest in the world. 3
These results were to be expected, and NATO's military and
political advisers must have contemplated them in their very
careful planning of the war, which went back more than a year
before the bombing commenced.
So, in our view and the view of most of the world, it was a
case of the American government and business class, aided and
abetted by their European counterparts, creating violent social
conditions, destroying every chance to peacefully resolve them,
and then imposing violent solutions. This was classic American-
ism. Like poverty in the midst of fabulous wealth, with the re-
sulting violence resolved by massive imprisonlment and a regular
dose of the death penalty.
In other words there were plenty of reasons to oppose this
war.
Another reason I opposed it was the grotesque Holocaust
analogy. Milosevic was a new Hitler. "Europe" had not seen this
kind of thing since the Holocaust (of course Africa had, and it
continues to, South America had, and Vietnam had). Maybe
Benigni's film La Vita Bella, so lavished with Hollywood awards
on the eve of the bombing, had made everyone think that trains
and refugees were enough to make a Holocaust.
Trains and refugees do not make a Holocaust. The worst
scenarios of Serb ethnic cleansing did not even come close to
the extermination program of the Nazis. You do not have to
minimize the suffering of people killed in the thousands, terror-
ized and expelled from their homes, to distinguish between that
and being hunted down one by one wherever we lived or wher-
ever we ran in a methodical plan (that succeeded by about half)
to wipe an entire people off the face of the earth. The Nazis, as
Julie Birchill wrote, did not put Jews on trains to Israel.3 ' And
what about the context? Did European Jewry have a separatist
army like the KLA that was trying to take a piece of Germany
away from the Nazis? If Srebrenica was "genocide," indeed "ex-
termination" in the absurdly hyperbolic opinion of the ICTY
33. Id.
34. Julie Birchill, Forty Reasons Why the Serbs Are Not the New Nazis and the Kosovars Are
Not the New Jews, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 1999, quoted in M. Hume, Nazifying the Serbs,
from Bosnia to Kosovo, in DEGRADED CAPABILITY. THE MEDIA AND THE Kosovo CRisIs
(Phillip Hammond & Edward Herman eds., 2000).
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judges in Krstic,35 what was the Holocaust? And if only the West
had merely "stood by!" Instead they locked their doors to Jewish
immigration and sent people back to their deaths. "Outmoded
notions of national sovereignty?" Had the world stood up for
national sovereignty and international law when Hitler invaded
Czechoslovakia, there would have been no Holocaust. And
when the Allies were engaged in a fully legal war with Germany
in Poland, and they were begged by Jews to go five kilometers
out of their way and bomb Auschwitz, which could have saved
hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives, they could not be both-
ered because it did not fit into their strategic plans.
It seemed to me that if there were any analogy, it was that
the West did not give a damn about the Albanians any more
than they did about the Jews.
A big part of the Holocaust analogy of course was the ICTY,
the Nuremberg precedent, and all that. This was something
played up by the Court itself, most notably in the ignorantly
bloated rhetoric of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald in speeches
before the war, but also in small details such as the tasteless dis-
play of Prosecutor Louise Arbour's photo in the Anne Frank
House in Amsterdam (which could be seen even as NATO's clus-
ter bombs started to fall on Yugoslavia) with a quote arguing that
she was continuing the work of punishing Anne Frank's murder-
ers.
What were the real motives for the war if they were clearly
not the humanitarian ones that NATO claimed? This was what
made people of good will suspend their disbelief. It was hard to
find the classic imperialist motives in this godforsaken part of
the world. But there were, in fact, many war-making interests
that converged here: the need to invent a new role for NATO
after the Cold War, arms manufacturers' profits, a good place to
test weapons, lucrative reconstruction contracts, a war pour en-
courager les autres, like the war against Saddam, (that is to say a
35. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33,Judgment (1998). In this case,
the ICTY decided that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of a maximum 8,000 Bosnian Mus-
lim men of military age was enough for the intent to destroy a national etc. group "in
part," namely the part that lived in the small town of Srebrenica. But even there the
killings were found to be part of a plan to displace the population permanently, which
was arguable in the context of the jockeying for territory of the Bosnian civil war. Ap-
plying this to Kosovo would take the creative decision-making of the ICTY to an entirely
new level.
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demonstration war for those who think they can oppose Ameri-
can will), a war against a weak enemy that could be fought with-
out losing one American life in combat, security for the much-
coveted Caspian Sea oil pipeline, and even Monica Lewinsky-
all these are far more plausible explanations than a sudden, iso-
lated instance of humanitarianism on the part of the Americans.
One very important strategic interest seems to have been
the United States' desperate desire, especially in the Clinton
years, to free itself of the discipline of the United Nations
("U.N.") system, including the Security Council's monopoly of
the use of force, which from Washington's point of view, puts far
too much institutional power in the hands of its rivals Russia and
China. This is the powerful thesis of the Englishman Peter
Gowan, that the Balkans was an excuse for the United States to
redesign the world order in its own image.36 Through the beg-
garing of the U.N. (including the firing of an independent Sec-
retary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his replacement with
long time NATO friend Kofi Annan), and the expansion of
NATO eastward, the United States has sought to establish NATO
as the world's only legitimate active military interventionist
force. Because, while the United States only has one vote at the
U.N. and in the Security Council, by virtue of its military power it
owns NATO. Ninety percent of the military hardware used in the
Kosovo war was American." The other countries merely pro-
vided political cover.
There are always lots and lots of military and political rea-
sons for going to war for a superpower, but the circumstances
have to be right. The Balkans was about as good an excuse that
could be hoped for, since humanitarianism could be a plausible
justification, (given the world's most powerful propaganda ma-
chine, namely the American news media) and the enemy was too
weak to cause any losses.
But the problem (or the point in Gowan's view) was that it
was illegal, and over this there was no controversy.38
This war was a conscious violation of international law and
the U.N. Charter. The Charter authorizes the use of force in
36. Peter Gowan, The Real Meaning of The War Over Kosovo, in THE SOCIALIST REGIS-
TER 2000: NECESSARY AND UNNECESSARY UTOPIAS (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 1999).
37. IGNATIEFF, supra note 9, at 206.
38. See Gowan, supra note 36.
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only two situations: self-defense, or when the Security Council
authorizes it. 9 The jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice is also very clear. For instance, it stated in its ruling
against the United States' intervention in Nicaragua (another
bloody imperialistic war fought in the name of human rights-
though not international justice):
In any event, while the United States might form its own ap-
praisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nica-
ragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method
to monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to the steps
actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly hu-
manitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining
of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again with the
training, arming and equipping of the contras. 4°
It should also be noted that the preliminary decision of the
World Court in Yugoslavia's case against ten NATO countries
does not contradict this in the slightest. The decision to reject
Yugoslavia's claim for preliminary measures against the attack
was taken on purely jurisdictional grounds. First, the United
States' refusal to recognize the World Court's jurisdiction in gen-
eral; and second, objections (by Canada and others) to jurisdic-
tion in this specific case.4 '
So in the case of NATO's war on Yugoslavia, neither of the
two exclusive bases for the use of force (Security Council author-
ization or self-defense) was even claimed by NATO. It should be
pointed out that this is a very rare case of scholarly consensus:
the war's illegality is not disputed by any legal scholar of repute,
even those who had some sympathy for the war, for instance Pro-
fessor Antonio Cassese, former President and Judge of the ICTY
itself.
42
Incidentally, as a violation of the U.N. Charter, the attack
on Yugoslavia was also a violation of the NATO Treaty. The
NATO Treaty, so far as is relevant, reads as follows:
[Preamble]: The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in
39. See U.N. CHARTER chs. I, V-VII.
40. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 70, 134-35 (June
27).
41. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 106 (June 2).
42. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legit-
imation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 24 (1999).
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the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments.
Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in
which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered, and to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 7: This treaty does not affect, and shall not be inter-
preted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations
under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the
United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity.4"
Another very important and uncontroversial legal element
of all this was that the claimed humanitarian motives for the war,
even if they were true, could not change its illegal character. In
fact, the reason why there is such unanimity among scholars on
the illegality of this war is that there is no "humanitarian excep-
tion" under international law or the U.N. Charter. Such an ex-
ception would have sounded distinctly Hitlerian to the drafters
of the Charter, because that is how Hitler justified his aggression
in World War II. This does not mean that there are no means
for the international community to intervene to prevent or stop
humanitarian disasters, even to use force where necessary. Itjust
means that the use of force for humanitarian purposes has been
totally absorbed in the U.N. Charter. A State must use only
peaceful means or be able to demonstrate the humanity of its
proposed intervention to the Security Council, including, of
course, the five permanent members possessing a veto.
The apparent contradiction (that humanitarianism is a
ground of intervention but only when authorized by the Security
Council) is not so difficult to understand. It is as if the police
arrested and imprisoned someone without trial, arguing that,
since they had plenty of proof, why bother with the formalities of
a trial?
43. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, pmbl., arts. 1, 7, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S.
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It is well known that one of the justifications for the war was
the supposed untrustworthiness of the Security Council. But im-
agine the police in the example just given claiming that the
courts were so biased or inefficient that they could not be relied
upon to convict the guilty. Now imagine the police making the
same claim when they themselves were the ones sabotaging the
courts. Almost all the vetoing in the Security Council since the
1960's has been the NATO countries: eighty-six percent of all
vetoes between 1966 and 1997.44 In the last ten years, the
United States alone has accounted for sixty-three percent of the
vetoes.45 In March 2001, it vetoed an international observer
force for Israel.46
In fact the Security Council was far from "paralyzed" as the
NATO defenders like to put it. The Security Council had issued
numerous Resolutions authorizing action in this very conflict
(Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203 of 1998, and Resolutions
1239 and 1244 of 1999, the last of which brought an end to the
bombing). None of them authorized the use of force, of course,
but not because the Security Council was incapable of doing so.
The United States' war to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 was
explicitly authorized by Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990. 47
Indeed, the NATO bombings during the Bosnian civil war were
expressly authorized by Security Council Resolutions 816 and
836 of 1993, "subject to close cooperation with the Secretary-
General and UNPROFOR."48
This, of course, is not to defend either of these cases of the
use of force, merely to show that the Security Council was far
from incapable of authorizing it.
So the Gowan thesis is amply demonstrated by the fact that
the United States had systematically undermined the U.N. sys-
44. SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
239 (3d ed. 1998).
45. Id.
46. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Ces-
sation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, SC/6659 (Mar. 26,
1999); Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Draft Resolution on Middle East Situation
Rejected by Security Council, SC/7040 (Mar. 27, 2001), available at http://www0.un.
org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7040.doc.htm.
47. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., S/RES/678 (1990).
48. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st mtg., S/RES/816 (1993); S.C. Res. 836, U.N.
SCOR, 3228th mtg., S/RES/836 (1993).
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tern so that it could deliberately boycott it in this case and estab-
lish a new precedent.
But to do this they had to appeal to a higher legality, not
their own naked power, and that is where the ICTY came in.
This U.N. organ would give the war the needed appearance of
international legality, as law enforcement against war crimes.
Now it was only to be expected that, with most of the world
opposed to the war, there would be quite a few lawyers who
would feel the same way and who would harbor well-founded
suspicions about the ICTY. With NATO bombing away and act-
ing like a bull in a china shop with human life, they would be
moved to call the ICTY's bluff by bringing charges against the
NATO leaders for violations of the same Geneva Conventions
that Arbour and company were charging the Serbs with. In fact,
within a month of the commencement of the bombing, several
more or less detailed legal complaints had been delivered to the
ICTY, including one from the Faculty of Law of Belgrade Univer-
sity, one from Greece on behalf of 6,000 Greek citizens, one
from England from a group called the Committee for the Ad-
vancement of International Criminal Law, one from a Commit-
tee of the Russian Duma, and our own complaint from Canada
on behalf of law professors from York University in Toronto
jointly with the American Association of Jurists, a group with
members throughout the Western hemisphere. To this must be
added the thousands of individuals from every corner of the
globe who wrote to the ICTY endorsing our complaints or mak-
ing their own.
In our case, we filed a complaint against sixty-eight named
NATO leaders. The charges were:
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 (contrary to Article 2) namely the following acts against
persons or property protected under the provisions of the rel-
evant Geneva Convention: (a) wilful killing; (b) wilfully caus-
ing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (c)
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, notjus-
tified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
Violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3): (a) em-
ployment of poisonous weapons or other weapons to cause
unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
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(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of unde-
fended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of,
destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, his-
toric monuments and works of art and science.
Crimes against humanity (Article 5): (a) murder; (i) other
inhumane acts.
Article 7 of the Tribunal Statute provides for "individual crimi-
nal responsibility" in this way:
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as
Head of State or Government or as a responsible Govern-
ment official, shall not relieve such person of criminal re-
sponsibility or mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of
the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the supe-
rior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.49
The legal case was based on two grounds. First, we focused
on the illegality of the war. This was a classic war of aggression,
which the Nuremberg Judgment had classified as the "supreme"
crime: "To initiate a war of aggression ... is the supreme inter-
national crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."50
Now this crime was not included in the ICTY Statute as a
specific crime. Evidently the United States did not want it there,
the way it desperately did not want it in the International Crimi-
nal Court ("ICC") Statute. 51 Was it for "difficulty of definition"
49. ICTY Statute, supra note 1.
50. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE AS PRESENTED BY ROBERT H. JACKSON
CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS (1971).
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
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as is often said? As if war crimes and crimes against humanity
were easy to define. Once again Milosevic's explanation is the
only one that makes sense: the ICTY was meant to legitimate
aggression, so how could it criminalize it?
On the other hand the crime of aggression was not specifi-
cally excluded. And in the article on "crimes against humanity"
there were the crimes of murder and other inhumane acts. 52
Murder is universally defined as causing death intentionally-
which, in classic criminal law doctrine, always includes know-
ingly-and without lawful excuse.
Our case was simply that the NATO leaders planned and
executed a bombing campaign that was contrary to the most fun-
damental tenets of international law and that they knew would
cause the death and permanent injury of thousands of civilian
men, women, and children. They admitted this over and over
again, said they were sorry but that is what happens in war, and
went on bombing. On this ground alone, for example, the kill-
ing of hundreds or thousands of civilians knowingly and without
lawful excuse, these leaders are guilty of mass murder. Milosevic
and the other Serb leaders were indicted in The Hague for the
murder of 385 victims. 53 The total victims of the ninety-eight
people executed for murder in the United States in 1999 was
129.5" The NATO leaders murdered at least 500 and perhaps as
many as 1,800. 55
Here is what Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson said on the
subject at Nuremberg:
Any resort to war-any kind of war-is a resort to means
that are inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of kill-
ings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and destruction of prop-
erty. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves
those lawfully conducting it from criminality. But inherently
criminal acts cannot be defended by showing that those who commit-
ted them were engaged in a war, when war itself is illegal. The very
minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggres-
sive war illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them of
52. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.
53. Milosevic et. al, supra note 5.
54. Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpintl.
html.
55. Press Release, Prosecutor for International Tribunals Briefs Security Council,
supra note 2.
2001]
114 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
every defense the law ever gave, and to leave the war-makers
subject to judgment by the usually accepted principles of the
law of crimes. (Emphasis added)5 6
Then there were the Geneva Conventions, which basically
make it a crime, even in a legal war, to kill and injure civilians
intentionally or carelessly, while not taking care to hit only mili-
tary targets.5
7
According to admissions made in public throughout the war
(for instance during daily NATO press briefings), eye-witness re-
ports, and powerful circumstantial evidence displayed on the
world's television screens throughout the bombing campaign-
evidence good enough to convict in any criminal court in the
world-these NATO leaders deliberately and illegally made
targets of places and things with only tenuous or slight military
value or no military value at all.58 NATO leaders targeted places
such as city bridges, factories, hospitals, marketplaces, downtown
and residential neighborhoods, and television studios. The
same evidence shows that, in doing this, the NATO leaders
aimed to demoralize and break the will of the people, not to
defeat its army. Michael Dobbs, Madeleine Albright's author-
ized biographer, wrote in The Washington Post, on July 11, 1999,
"[I] t is obvious to anyone who visited Serbia during the war that
undermining civilian morale formed an essential part of the alli-
ance's war-winning strategy."59
One reason civilian targets are illegal is that civilians are
very likely to be killed or injured when such targets are hit. And
all of the NATO leaders knew that. They were carefully told that
by their military planners. And they still went ahead and did it.
And they did it without any risk to themselves or to their
soldiers and pilots. That is why this war was called a "cowards'
war." The cowardice lay in fighting the civilian population and
not the military, in bombing from altitudes so high that the civil-
ians, Serbs, Albanians, Roma, and anybody else on the ground
bore all the risks of the "inevitable collateral damage." Displac-
56. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 82-84.
57. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
58. See e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 18; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3; MIN-
ISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, NATO CRIMES IN YUGOSLA-
VIA: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, VOLUMES I AND II (1999).
59. Michael Dobbs, A War-Torn Reporter Reflects, WASH. PosT, July 11, 1999, at B1.
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ing all the risks onto the civilian population is contrary to the
recognized laws of war.
Indeed, there was persuasive evidence that, in some circum-
stances at least, NATO not only knowingly killed civilians, but that
it deliberately set out to do so: for example, on the Grdelica and
Varvarin bridges on April 12 and May 30, and in the Nis market-
place on May 7.6
Starting in May 1999, along with many other lawyers and
parliamentarians around the world, and thousands of individual
citizens, we made our case to the Tribunal. We spent hours with
Arbour, Del Ponte, and their advisers. We filed briefs of legal
arguments and documentary evidence. In December of 1999,
Del Ponte let it slip in an interview that she was studying our
case. 61 All hell broke loose. American military authorities said
they would never cooperate.62 Did she call for sanctions? No,
she unctuously apologized and backtracked.63 By March of
2000, it was clear to us that she was a fraud and we publicly de-
nounced her as such.
Del Ponte announced her decision to the Security Council
on June 2, but the report was only released on June 13.64 Why
did she anticipate the results? Only one explanation: she knew
that Amnesty International was releasing its report on June 7
with a very different conclusion from the Prosecutor's, and she
wanted to beat them to the punch. You should read these two
reports in order to see whether Del Ponte's bleating about
Milosevic can be given any credibility at all.
Amnesty's executive summary reads as follows:
Amnesty International believes that in the course of Opera-
tion Allied Force, civilian deaths could have been significantly
reduced if NATO forces had fully adhered to the laws of war.
60. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 35-36, 68-70.
61. Jerome Sokolovsky, U.N. Prosecutor Investigating NATO's Conduct in Yugoslavia
Bombing Campaign, AssoCIATED PRESS, Dec. 28, 1999.
62. Rowan Scarborough, U.S. Denounces U.N. Probe of NATO Bombing, WASH. TIMES,
December 30, 1999, at Al.
63. Press Release, Statement by Madame Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Dec. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p459-e.htm.
64. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. PR/
P.I.S./510-E (2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm
[hereinafter OTP Report].
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NATO did not always meet its legal obligations in selecting
targets and in choosing means and methods of attack. In one
instance, the attack on the headquarters of Serbian state ra-
dio and television (RTS), NATO launched a direct attack on a
civilian object, killing 16 civilians. Such attack breached article
52 (I) of Protocol I and therefore constitutes a war crime. The Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should
investigate all credible allegations of serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law during Operation Allied Force
with a view of bringing to trial anyone against whom there is
sufficient admissible evidence. States should surrender to the
Tribunal any suspect sought for prosecution by the Tribu-
nal.65
Amnesty's report identifies three basic types of war crimes
committed by NATO. First, the attacks on civilian targets such as
the Belgrade RTS radio and television building were contrary to
Article 52(1) of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention (1977),66
and made criminal by Article 2 of the Tribunal Statute.6 7 Sec-
ond, for example, in the killing of civilians on bridges (Grdelica,
Luzane, and Varvarin), NATO failed to suspend attacks even af-
ter it became clear that it would cause loss of civilian life, which
was excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage to be
anticipated, and in contravention of Article 57(2)(b). 68 Third,
for example in bombings that killed displaced civilians
(Djakovica and Koriga), insufficient precautions were taken to
minimize civilian casualties, contrary to 57(2)(a).69 Specifically
on the "cowards' war" question of bombing from 15,000 feet:
"Also, aspects of the Rules of Engagement, specifically the re-
quirement that NATO aircraft fly above 15,000 feet, made full
adherence to international humanitarian law virtually impossi-
ble. ' 70 Amnesty also found a lack of discrimination contrary to
the Geneva Conventions in the use of cluster bombs: "The use
of certain weapons, particularly cluster bombs, may have contrib-
65. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
66. Id.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391, art. 52, 11.
67. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 2.
68. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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uted to causing unlawful deaths."71
The Amnesty Report ends with nine illuminating case stud-
ies. They include the five selected by the Office of the Prosecu-
tor's ("OTP") Report and make for striking comparisons.
The OTP Report comes as something of a shock, not for its
conclusion (which was expected, though admittedly not in the
extreme form in which it came), but for the amateurishness and
lack of shame with which it justifies that conclusion.
If it feels more like it was written by a lawyer for NATO than
a judge, this should not be surprising, because there is little
doubt that the brief was in fact written by a NATO lawyer, if only
an ex-NATO lawyer, Canadian Armed Forces Frigate Captain
William J. Fenrick (ret.). Fenrick has been involved in the pro-
ject from the beginning, leaving his position as Director of Law
for Operations and Training in the Canadian Department of De-
fense to help set up the Tribunal in 1992. It is worth remember-
ing that the Tribunal was created at the insistence of the Ameri-
cans, and that at the very moment of its creation U.S. Secretary
of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, publicly identified Serb leaders
Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic, and Arkan as war criminals. Fenrick
became senior legal advisor of the Tribunal when it was officially
launched in 1995. The OTP Report is unsigned, attributed to an
anonymous "committee" charged with the case by Arbour in May
1999 (one week after we served our complaint), but amateur
sleuths will notice that it quotes great swaths of an article au-
thored by Fenrick in 1997-word for word and without quota-
tion marks.72
On the other hand, the report often goes beyond even the
lawyer's brief and comes as close as possible to being an actual
NATO press release that might have been issued by Jamie Shea
71. Id.
72. Paragraphs 35-42 and 48-50 of the report (OTP Report, supra note 64) are
lifted verbatim from William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Of-
fense 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539, 542-46 (1997), except for one bow to political
correctness when the word "people" is substituted for "women." The sentence in the
journal reads: "For example, bombing a refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only
military significance is that women in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers." Id. at
545. Whereas in the OTP Report it becomes: "For example, bombing a refugee camp
is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that people in the camp are
knitting socks for soldiers." OTP Report, supra note 64, 48. This fact would certainly
not have been known to me if Fenrick himself had not proudly presented me with an
offprint of his article when we argued our case in The Hague in November 1999.
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or James Rubin. These hard-nosed experts at the ICTY, with all
their experience in investigating war crimes, declared that their
operating investigative technique would be to read NATO's press
releases and take them at face value:
The committee has conducted its review relying essentially
upon public documents, including statements made by
NATO and NATO countries at press conferences and public
documents produced by the FRY. It has tended to assume
that the NATO and NATO countries' press statements are
generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly
given.
7 3
Can you imagine what kind of law enforcement a country would
have if the police took alleged crooks' explanations at face
value? Can you imagine how many indictments would have been
issued against the Serb leadership if the OTP had stopped at the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY') press releases? It is not
as if NATO had proved its veracity to the OTP by opening its
books to them and making a full account. There was no investi-
gation because NATO did not allow it: "The committee must
note, however, that when the OTP requested NATO to answer
specific questions about specific incidents, the NATO reply was
couched in general terms and failed to address the specific inci-
dents."74 In fact, as far as the record goes, the OTP sent one
letter to NATO on February 8, 2000 and NATO replied ("in gen-
eral terms" etc.) on May 10.75
So, having determined that NATO did not want to be inves-
tigated, the OTP had to absolve them without an investigation,
hence the "face value" principle. But even this would not do the
trick entirely, because NATO made some pretty damning public
admissions along the way. For instance, in bombing the Bel-
grade television station, some NATO leaders claimed (most im-
plausibly), that they did it to knock out FRY military communica-
tions, but others (for example, Tony Blair) said they did it to
strike a blow against Serb "propaganda" (meaning that they did
not like what the television was saying), which is an unmistakable
war crime. That left only one thing to do: take the NATO ver-
sion most favorable to NATO!
73. OTP Report, supra note 64, 190.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
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The report is so weak in its reasoning, so untroubled by in-
consistency and double standards, that one cannot help wonder-
ing whether the authors had spent too much time in The
Hague's famous "coffee shops." For example, when they said
that 500 deaths were too few to be considered crimes against
humanity,76 did they realize that Milosevic had been charged
with 385? "If one accepts the figures in this compilation of ap-
proximately 495 civilians killed and 820 civilians wounded in
documented instances, there is simply no evidence of the neces-
sary crime base for charges of genocide or crimes against hu-
manity."77 And what about paragraph fifty-six? Did they do the
math on a napkin?
The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlaw-
ful about flying above the height which can be reached by
enemy air defenses. However, NATO air commanders have a
duty to take practicable measures to distinguish military
objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet
minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may
have meant the target could not be verified with the naked
eye. However, it appears that with the use of modern tech-
nology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried
out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing cam-
paign.
"Vast majority"! What can this mean in a bombing campaign of
38,000 sorties? Seventy-five percent would mean 9,500 sorties for
which it did not comply with its legal obligation. Ninety per-
cent? That would mean 3,800. Ninety-nine percent? That
would leave 380 sorties-just enough to kill 500 people, if you
are using the most powerful conventional weapons technology
in the world.
Even with all this, the OTP had major problems defending
the decision not even to open an investigation because the or-
thodox legal tests laid down by the Statute and deployed so
handily to prosecute the Serbs became extremely inconvenient
where absolving NATO was concerned. They had to undergo a
major transformation.
The civilian principle of lobbligatorietd delldzione penale ("ob-
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id. at 53.
78. Id. at 156.
2001]
120 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ligatory prosecution") written into the Statute in the clearest
terms became the "discretion" to open an investigation. This
discretion then became exercisable only when there was proof
beyond any doubt that the accused were guilty. On this basis, of
course, Milosevic never could have been charged. The clearest
and most chilling example of this is the Grdelica bridge inci-
dent.
On April 12, a NATO plane launched two separate laser-
guided bombs that hit a passenger train crossing a bridge, killing
at least ten people and injuring at least fifteen. NATO's explana-
tion, offered by General Wesley Clark the next day at a news con-
ference, was that the pilot was attacking the bridge and not the
train, and that the pilot did not see the train until the last second
because it was going too fast. 9 According to the OTP: "It does
not appear that the train was targeted deliberately."' 0 Why?
More work for the face value principle: U.S. Deputy Defense
Secretary John Hamre and General Wesley Clark, NATO's Su-
preme Allied Commander for Europe, said so! The OTP repro-
duced Clark's explanation in full:
[T] his was a case where a pilot was assigned to strike a rail-
road bridge that is part of the integrated communications
supply network in Serbia. He launched his missile from his
aircraft that was many miles away, he was not able to put his
eyes on the bridge, it was a remotely directed attack. And as
he stared intently at the desired target point on the bridge,
and I talked to the team at Aviano who was directly engaged
in this operation, as the pilot stared intently at the desired
aim point on the bridge and worked it, and worked it, and
worked it, and all of a sudden at the very last instant with less
than a second to go he caught a flash of movement that came
into the screen and it was the train coming in. Unfortunately
he couldn't dump the bomb at that point, it was locked, it was
going into the target and it was an unfortunate incident
which he, and the crew, and all of us very much regret. We
certainly don't want to do collateral damage.
The mission was to take out the bridge. He realized when it
had happened that he had not hit the bridge, but what he
had hit was the train. He had another aim point on the
79. See NATO Spokesperson Jamie Shea & General Wesley Clark, Press Conference
(Apr. 13, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990413a.htm.
80. OTP Report, supra note 64, 59.
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bridge, it was a relatively long bridge and he believed he still
had to accomplish his mission, the pilot circled back around.
He put his aim point on the other end of the bridge from
where the train had come, by the time the bomb got close to
the bridge it was covered with smoke and clouds and at the
last minute again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid
forward from the original impact and parts of the train had
moved across the bridge, and so that by striking the other end
of the bridge he actually caused additional damage to the
train.
8 1
General Clark then showed the cockpit video of the plane that
fired on the bridge:
The pilot in the aircraft is looking at about a 5-inch screen, he
is seeing about this much and in here you can see this is the
railroad bridge which is a much better view than he actually
had, you can see the tracks running this way. Look very in-
tently at the aim point, concentrate right there and you can
see how, if you were focused right on your job as a pilot, sud-
denly that train appeared. It was really unfortunate. Here,
he came back around to try to strike a different point on the
bridge because he was trying to do a job to take the bridge
down. Look at this aim point-you can see smoke and other
obscuration there-he couldn't tell what this was exactly. Fo-
cus intently right at the centre of the cross. He is bringing
these two crosses together and suddenly he recognizes at the
very last instant that the train that was struck here has moved
on across the bridge and so the engine apparently was struck
by the second bomb. 2
The OTP's dismissal of this particular incident was rendered
more complicated by the fact that a German computer whiz, Mr.
Ekkehard Wenz, an opponent of the war acting entirely inde-
pendently, analyzed the video and the technical information
provided by NATO, and discovered that the video shown by
Clark had been speeded up to about five times its speed and that
the plane was the type in which there was both a pilot and a
gunner. He concluded that the attack on the train must have
been deliberate. 3 After a German newspaper report, NATO fi-
nally admitted in January 2000 that the video had been sped
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Ekkehard Wenz, The Grdelica Organization, Comment on ICTY's Final Re-
port to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
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up. 4 The OTP report does not dispute Wenz's points-nor nat-
urally does the incident shake its faith in the trustworthiness of
NATO's press releases-but it argues that this still does not
prove Wenz's case:
If the committee accepts Mr. Wenz's estimate of the reaction
time available, the person controlling the bombs still had a
very short period of time, less than 7 or 8 seconds in all
probability to react. Although Mr. Wenz is of the view that
the WSO [Weapons Systems Operator] intentionally targeted
the train, the committee's review of the frames used in the
report indicates another interpretation is equally available.
The cross hairs remain fixed on the bridge throughout, and it
is clear from this footage that the train can be seen moving
toward the bridge only as the bomb is in flight: it is only in
the course of the bomb's trajectory that the image of the train
becomes visible. At a point where the bomb is within a few
seconds of impact, a very slight change to the bomb aiming
point can be observed, in that it drops a couple of feet. This
sequence regarding the bombsights indicates that it is un-
likely that the WSO was targeting the train, but instead sug-
gests that the target was a point on the span of the bridge
before the train appeared.85
Notice the standard: "another interpretation is equally available."
Only "equally available." In other words, even though there was
a fifty-fifty chance that a dozen civilians had been murdered by
NATO-which would put a rather different complexion on the
whole bombing campaign-there would be no further investiga-
tion.
That aside, the OTP's point is, that if the train had been
deliberately targeted, the pilot would have followed it with his
cross hairs. Unless, of course, he was trying to "fabricate an acci-
dent," which is Mr. Wenz's point, posted in a comment for his
group, the Grdelica Organization, on July 12, 2000:
As visible most clearly in the decelerated video, the target
point during the beginning of the scene was the abutment of
the bridge on the center pier. Shortly after the train reached
the bridge, the target point is completely changed from this
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (July 12, 2000), at http://
www.balkanpeace.org/lan/lanIO.shtml.
84. See id. 7.
85. See OTP Report, supra note 64, 61.
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point, which is the only reasonable point to take out truss
bridges, towards a truss part, that's loss might damage the
bridge but would not destroy the bridge at all (as happened).
Since NATO maintained that missions were planned exactly,
it is not very likely that truss bridges were intended to be dis-
mantled brace by brace with [U.S.$800,000] missiles. The
reason to give up a "perfect" aiming point in favour of an-
other unreasonable aiming point, in combination with the
presentation of speeded video material, can only be that the
previous aiming point wasn't the intended aiming point. In
other words: this is the way to fabricate an "accident.
8 6
Mr. Wenz also points out a number of other errors: that the
bombs were not laser-guided but "TV-guided" (that is, from a
television in the bomb, which makes for much greater control),
that there was a third bomb that did not hit the bridge at all,
suggesting that the bridge was not the target; and that seven or
eight seconds from the appearance of the train was plenty of
time for a Weapons Systems Operator, with only that duty, to
change the path of the target (in the whole video the target is
changed six times in twenty-three seconds). In an e-mail to me,
Wenz put it this way: "Sit back, close your eyes and count slowly
from twenty-one to twenty-eight. Enough time?" Thus, Wenz's
view is that the Weapons Systems Officer had plenty of time after
he saw the train to put the bomb wherever he wanted.
So, the OTP analysis of the first bomb is completely uncon-
vincing. But its analysis of the second bomb is non-existent:
The train was on the bridge when the bridge was targeted a
second time and the bridge length has been estimated at 50
meters. It is the opinion of the committee that the informa-
tion in relation to the attack with the first bomb does not pro-
vide a sufficient basis to initiate an investigation. [ Yeah, but
what about the second one?] The committee has divided views
concerning the attack with the second bomb in relation to
whether there was an element of recklessness in the conduct
of the pilot or WSO. Despite this, the committee is in agree-
ment that, based on the criteria for initiating an investigation,
this incident should not be investigated. In relation to
whether there is information warranting consideration of
command responsibility, the committee is of the view that
there is no information from which to conclude that an inves-
86. Wenz, supra note 83, 112.
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tigation is necessary into the criminal responsibility of per-
sons higher in the chain of command. Based on the informa-
tion available to it, it is the opinion of the committee that the
attack on the train at Grdelica Gorge should not be investi-
gated by the OTP. 7
This is nothing less than incoherent babbling. There is zero ex-
planation of how firing a second bomb with knowledge that the
train was on the bridge could not constitute recklessness (a con-
sciousness that civilians might be endangered). Wenz has also
pointed out that the bridge was subsequently repaired by Yugo-
slavia, not rebuilt, which means that NATO used some very ex-
pensive bombs to hit a bridge twice without destroying it.
We are talking here about opening an investigation in a case
where the committee was divided in its views! Where there is no
other plausible explanation. Milosevic had lots of explanations
for Racak, that were quite credible in fact. Louise Arbour did
not wait to hear them before she "launched her investigation"
the next day. On the other hand, listen to what Amnesty said
about the same incident:
NATO's explanation of the bombing-particularly General
Clark's account of the pilot's rationale for continuing the at-
tack after he had hit the train-suggests that the pilot had
understood the mission was to destroy the bridge regardless
of the cost in terms of civilian casualties. This would violate
the rules of distinction and proportionality. Yet, even if the
pilot was, for some reason, unable to ascertain that no train
was travelling towards the bridge at the time of the first at-
tack, he was fully aware that the train was on the bridge when
he dropped the second bomb, whether smoke obscured its
exact whereabouts or not. This decision to proceed with the
second attack appears to have violated Article 57 of Protocol I
which requires an attack to "be cancelled or suspended if it
becomes clear that the objective is not a military one . . . or
that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life . . . which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Unless
NATO is justified in believing that destroying the bridge at
that particular moment was of such military importance as to
justify the number of civilian casualties likely to be caused by
continuing the attack-an argument that NATO has not
87. OTP Report, supra note 64, 62 (citations omitted).
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made-the attack should have been stopped.8 8
The third incident discussed by the OTP was the deliberate
attack by NATO on the RTS (Serbian Television and Radio Sta-
tion) in Belgrade on April 23 in which sixteen people are be-
lieved to have been killed. The OTP concedes that this would
have been a crime if the station were taken out for "propaganda"
reasons alone (as Blair's statement admits), but concludes on
the basis of statements by other NATO officials that it may not have
been and thus decides not to open an investigation!9 The report
also shifts the blame entirely to the FRY for allowing the civilians
to stay at the station after they had been warned.9" As if a robber
were to come to your house and tell you to leave, and you did
not and he killed you, and any self-respecting judge would say he
was not guilty of murder.
Here is what Amnesty said:
Amnesty International recognizes that disrupting government
propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the popu-
lation and the armed forces, but believes that justifying an
attack on a civilian facility on such grounds stretches the
meaning of "effective contribution to military action" and
"definite military advantage" beyond the acceptable bounds
of interpretation. Under the requirements of Article 52(2) of
Protocol I, the RTS headquarters cannot be considered a mil-
itary objective. As such, the attack on the RTS headquarters
violated the prohibition to attack civilian objects contained in
Article 52(1) and therefore constitutes a war crime.
The attack on the RTS headquarters may well have violated
international humanitarian law even if the building could
have been properly considered a military objective. Specifi-
cally, that attack would have violated the rule of proportional-
ity under Article 51(5) (b) of Protocol I and may have also
violated the obligations to provide effective warning under
Article 57(2) (c) of the same Protocol.
Article 51(5) (b) prohibits attacks "which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life ... which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." NATO must have clearly anticipated that civil-
88. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 17.
89. See OTP Report, supra note 64, 74-79.
90. U.S. Dep't of Defense, News Briefing (May 17, 1999), available at www.web.
amnesty.org/ai/nsf/index/eur700182000.
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ians in the RTS building would have been killed. In addition,
it appears that NATO realized that attacking the RTS build-
ing would only interrupt broadcasting for a brief period.
SACEUR General Wesley Clark has stated: "We knew when
we struck that there would be alternate means of getting the
Serb Television. There's no single switch to turn off every-
thing but we thought it was a good move to strike it and the
political leadership agreed with us." In other words, NATO
deliberately attacked a civilian object, killing 16 civilians, for
the purpose of disrupting Serbian television broadcasts in the
middle of the night for approximately three hours. It is hard
to see how this can be consistent with the rule of proportion-
ality.9 1
One question that Amnesty did not deal with, and on which
the OTP took a firm stand, concerned the effects of the illegality
of the war. We had stressed the importance of this to both pros-
ecutors. Our argument was that the illegality of the war and the
lack of any real (as opposed to claimed), humanitarian justifica-
tion, made the killing of civilians murder and therefore a "crime
against humanity." However, the OTP resolutely rejected this
proposition:
Allegations have been made that, as NATO's resort to force
was not authorized by the Security Council or in self-defense,
that the resort to force was illegal and, consequently, all force-
ful measures taken by NATO were unlawful.... In particular,
the legitimacy of the presumed basis for the NATO bombing
campaign, humanitarian intervention without prior Security
Council authorization, is hotly debated. That being said, as
noted in paragraph 4 above, the crime related to an unlawful
decision to use force is the crime against peace or aggression.
... [T]he ICTY does not have jurisdiction over crimes against
peace .... The ICTY has jurisdiction over serious violations
of international humanitarian law as specified in Articles 2-5
of the Statute. These are jus in bellum offences. 92
The result was that the Tribunal gave NATO immunity for civil-
ian deaths and injuries that were merely part of the war, exactly
as if this were a legal war. This is a preposterous reading of the
Statute and compares very unfavorably with Robert Jackson's
statement at Nuremberg cited earlier. ("But inherently criminal
91. See AMNESTV INT'L, supra note 3, at 23-24.
92. OTP Report, supra note 64, 130.
[Vol. 25:95
OUR CASE AGAINST NATO
acts cannot be defended by showing that those who committed them were
engaged in a war, when war itself is illegal.")9 3 Even if it were a
correct reading, it would certainly not save the ICTY's legitimacy
that its Statute had been so crudely drawn to make American war
crimes immune from punishment.
So my conclusion is that we are dealing in the ICTY with a
corrupt tribunal. It cannot even be trusted to give Milosevic a
fair trial. But this is not the main point. Even if Milosevic were
guilty, the failure to prosecute NATO crime renders the Tribu-
nal the opposite of what it claims to be. Not abstractly, but con-
cretely. Imagine that one mafia boss makes war on another and
then buys the police and the courts to prosecute only the other
one. Who would feel safe? Naturally, only those who kiss the
hand of the more powerful boss and pay him his pizzo. Then
they would be as free as birds to commit any crimes they wanted
(so long as they did not threaten Don Corleone's interests, of
course). In other words, all you have to do is play ball with the
Americans and you can do anything you want in Turkey, in Indo-
nesia, in Colombia, in Saudi Arabia and, I am sad to say, in
Israel.
What about the future? Maybe the ICTY was just a flawed
prototype, like the Wright brothers' first airplane with its wobbly
half-flight? But if we take a look at what has happened with the
ICC, it appears that corruption is the destiny of international
criminal law.
The ICC Statute signed in Rome in 19989' is as full of holes
as a plate of bucatini alla matriciana. Thanks to a big Western
lobbying effort, it effectively leaves out the "supreme crime" of
aggression, and defines war crimes in a way congenial to the big
powers (tending to exclude the kind they commit in their "hu-
manitarian interventions"). It also allows agreements between
States to override the duty to arrest war criminals; Pinochet
could not even have been arrested in Britain under the ICC.
The ICC has one good thing going for it, though: the
judges and prosecutors are not subject to an American veto (like
the judges and prosecutors of the ICTY via the Security Coun-
cil). But that means the Americans will never ratify it. They
have already said so. They signed it on the last day possible for
93. JACKSON, supra note 50, at 82-84.
94. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 51.
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reasons of pure public relations (the way Israel did), with Clin-
ton expressly saying that he recommended that it not be ratified.
Now, nobody seriously thinks you can have an international
criminal justice system without the world's most powerful coun-
try to enforce it, as American critics of the ICC have not been shy
in pointing out.9"
The result is that the ICC operates as pure propaganda: it
makes it seem that the punishment of America's enemies is part
of a universal movement against impunity. In this way it oper-
ates like the detention of Pinochet who was held during the war
in Yugoslavia and then released, as "a great precedent" that will
never be applied to him or anyone else the United States does
not want tried.
So international criminal justice seems destined to remain a
hypocritical expression of power, as typically American as the
death penalty and judicial review: repression as a solution to so-
cial problems and judges acting as an antidote to democracy-as
in the very election of President Bush II, where the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in a transparently biased decision, reversed its pro-
federalist jurisprudence and ordered Florida not to count votes,
evidently for fear that Bush might lose (Bush Sr. having ap-
pointed two of the judges who voted for Bush Jr.).96
We should question the very vision of international criminal
law.9 7 Have we not learned the lessons of a century of criminol-
ogy that violence has causes? International criminal law, like the
"war on terrorism," seems designed to banish all talk of causes,
beyond identifying this year's devil. But in a world of inequality
and of power gone berserk, we have more than enough causes to
explain ethnic violence, and terrorism as well. Is it not obvious
that we should try to foster the conditions that allow peace and
human rights to flourish, instead of allowing them to be de-
stroyed for reasons of greed, merely to come in afterwards and
punish the usual suspects?
95. Ruth Wedgewood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EURO.
J. INT'L L. 93 (1999); David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 12 (1999).
96. Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or 'How We Changed
Everything So That Everything Would Remain the Same,' 32 ISR. L. REv. 250 (1998).
97. Carrie Gustafson, International Criminal Courts: Some Dissident Views on the Con-
tinuation of War by Penal Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 51, 52-55 (1998).
